










I. Purpose of the Paper 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide IDRC with an introduction to some of the 
existing definitions, theories, evidence and researchable questions suggested in 
the contemporary literature on the rule of law.  The review does not attempt to be 
exhaustive, and draws heavily on a small number of key works, including in 
particular those by Trebilcock, Daniels, Davis, O’Donnell and Dam, all of them 
English language sources.  The idea is to add some substance to discussions on 
a topic that is both ubiquitous in current development debates, yet surprisingly 
elastic in terms of definition.  Given that the review focuses narrowly on outlining 
certain questions surrounding the rule of law, a whole host of sub-issues have 
not been addressed, such as policing or corruption to name two.   
 
A separate literature search undertaken by IDRC’s Research and Information 
Management Services Division (RIMSD) has revealed that the vast majority of 
research and commentary on the rule of law in the peer-reviewed literature is 
dominated by Western legal scholars, with the concept itself having been 
conceived of in Western Europe.  However, the search also revealed a 
substantial amount of case study literature from developing country scholars.2
 
    
 
II. Defining the Rule of Law: An Introduction 
 
“The phrase, ‘rule of law’ itself is attributable to the British jurist Albert 
Venn Dicey, whose 1885 Introduction to the Study of Law of the 
Constitution describes the rule of law as a ‘feature’ of the political 
institutions of England, apprehensible in two different ways: ‘that no man 
is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for 
a distinct breach of law…and that every man, whatever his rank or 
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
                                                 
1Gorman Vélez is an analyst with IDRC’s Policy and Planning Group.  She would like to recognize and thank 
those who provided feedback and contributions to the paper: Brent Herbert-Copley, Caitlin Myles, Rob 
Robertson, Gerd Schönwälder, Lauchlan Munro, Charaf Ahmimed, Asha Jalan, and Rajeev Chaturvedy.   
2 Several interesting initiatives are also underway that involve developing country researchers, including the 
Open Society Initiatives for Southern and West Africa, funded by the Soros Foundation, which have 
produced various publication undertaken by African scholars on rule of law issues.   A thorough literature 
search was conducted by Andrew Hubbertz of IDRC’s Research Information Management Services Division 
which contains several of these Open Society Initiative publications.  The literature search is available upon 
request. 
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jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 
15). 
 
While numerous scholars write on the rule of law, the variety of definitions that 
exist across the literature is striking.  O’Donnell (2004) argues that as a literal 
concept, the term is in some ways false, as, “…strictly speaking there is no ‘rule 
of law’ or ‘rule by laws, not men.’  All there is, sometimes, is individuals in various 
capacities interpreting rules which, according to some pre-established criteria, 
meet the condition of being generally considered law” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 33).  
While definitions differ, there are some generally accepted principles by which 
the rule of law can be held up to.  Raz (1977) puts forth the following principles:   
 
 All laws should be prospective, open, and clear and relatively stable;  
 The making of particular laws...must be guided by open, stable, clear, and 
general rules;  
 The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;  
 The principles of natural justice must be observed (i.e. open and fair hearing, 
absence of bias);  
 The courts should have review powers...to ensure conformity to the rule of  
law, and should be easily accessible; and 
 The discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert 
the law (Raz, 1977, Pg 198). 
 
While the above are generally accepted principles for rule of law, other scholars 
have raised questions around what constitutes law itself.  For example, is the 
realm of law bound to official legal bodies or can it “bleed into” established 
norms.  Berman (2005) draws attention to the myriad of non-legal institutions that 
may at various times “exert tremendous power over our actions even though they 
are not part of an ‘official’ state-based system...” such as “…ethnic groups, 
religious institutions, trade organizations, unions …” (Berman, 2005, Pg 507).  
Scholarship on legal consciousness, which signifies “the ways in which people 
imbibe, transform, and resist legal norms over time” (Berman, 2005, Pg 493) 
looks at how law is experienced in everyday life.  As noted by Kahn (1999), “long 
before we ever think about going to a courtroom, we encounter landlords and 
tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel guests – roles that already 
embed a variety of juridical notions” (quoted in Berman, 2005, P 494).   
 
Just as not all law (conceived widely) is generated by official bodies, it is 
conversely not desirable that all rights be held to formal legal enforcement, which 
Sen describes below: 
 
“A human right can be effectively invoked in contexts even where its legal 
enforcement would appear to be most inappropriate.  The moral right of a 
wife to participate fully, as an equal, in serious family decisions – no 
matter how chauvinist her husband is – may be acknowledged by many 
who would nevertheless not want this requirement to be legalized and 
enforced by the policy.  The ‘right to respect’ is another example in which 
the legalization and attempted enforcement would be problematic, even 
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bewildering.  Indeed, it is best to see human rights as a set of ethical 
claims, which must not be identified with legislated legal rights”  (Sen, 
1999, Pg 229).   
 
With the existence of several interpretations of law, it is not surprising that 
definitions of rule of law range from minimalist to comprehensive, and exist along 
a wide continuum that can be institutional, procedural or aspirational in nature.  A 
central debate in the literature surrounds whether the rule of law is an end in 
itself or a tool with which to attain greater goals.  Kleinfeld (1995) divides 
definitions of the rule of law into two categories: (1) those that emphasize the 
ends that the rule of law is intended to serve within society (such as upholding 
law and order, or providing predictable and efficient judgments), and (2) those 
that highlight the institutional attributes believed necessary to actuate the rule of 
law (such as comprehensive laws, well-functioning courts, and trained law 
enforcement agencies) (Kleinfeld, 1995, Pg 3).   
 
A minimalist definition of the rule of law makes no reference to rights, democracy, 
equality or justice:  “It consists of the enforcement of laws that have been publicly 
promulgated and passed in a preestablished manner; are prospective, general, 
stable, clear and hierarchically ordered (the more particular norms conform to the 
more general ones); and are applied to particular cases by courts independent 
from the political rulers and open to all, whose decisions respond to procedural 
requirements, and that establish guilt through the ordinary trial process” 
(Maravall, 2003, Pg 261).   Or, as O’Donnell describes, “that whatever law exists 
is written down and publicly promulgated by an appropriate authority before the 
events meant to be regulated by it, and is fairly applied by relevant state 
institutions including the judiciary (though other state institutions can be involved 
as well)” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 33). 
 
Similarly, Trebilcock and Daniels (2008) sort definitions into categories described 
as thick or thin.  Much like those described as minimalist, “thin” or formalistic 
definitions of the rule of law are “…limited to those few spare features common to 
most, though not all, legal systems” that exist because “rational people need a 
predictable system to guide their behaviour and organize their lives in a way that 
minimizes unproductive conflict with other agents” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, 
Pg 20).  Thin definitions therefore have no bearing on whether the laws imposed 
are just, or on how the laws themselves are arrived at.  
 
On the other hand, “thick” conceptions of the rule of law tend to link the concept 
to freedom or egalitarianism, and can be prescriptive in nature.  In some cases, 
thick definitions of the rule of law have gone so far as to represent a 
“comprehensive political morality” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 17).  For 
example, O’Donnell defines the rule of law to include democratic principles, 
including that, “1) [i]t upholds the political rights, freedoms, and guarantees of a 
democratic regime; 2) it upholds the civil rights of the whole population; and 3) it 
establishes networks of responsibility and accountability which entail that all 
public and private agents, including the highest state officials, are subject to 
appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their acts” 
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(O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 32).  Some authors caution that there are risks in 
associating the rule of law with concepts like justice or other highly subjective 
terms, and note that by “treating any particular conception of justice as universal 
and self-evident, one may actually be doing violence to democracy” (Trebilcock 
and Daniels, 2008, Pg 19). 
 
Trebilcock and Daniels (2008) fail to find either thick or thin options appealing, 
and hence draw on a “thinner” conception of the rule of law, which sees “the rule 
of law as both a set of ideals and an institutional framework… it is concerned first 
and foremost with both the conceptual soundness and institutional protection of 
rules…interpretive and applicational methodologies, and …processes of judicial 
and other enforcement with the axiological purpose of providing such functions 
as social and economic coordination” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 25).  
Notably, they tie their definition to wider developmental goals: 
 
“Our procedural definition of the rule of law consists in an enumeration…of  
normative benchmarks for key legal institutions [e.g. the judiciary, 
prosecutors, police, penal systems, specialized law enforcement 
agencies, legal aid, bar associations, and legal education], running the 
gamut from the judiciary to the legal education system.  These normative 
benchmarks, in turn, are to be justified in terms of the contribution they 
make to human development…” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 25).     
 
Other definitions of the rule of law approach the issue from a slightly different 
angle.  For example, Tamanaha (1995) suggests that it requires “…only that the 
government abide by the rules promulgated by the political authority and treat its 
citizens with basic human dignity, and that there be access to a fair and neutral 
(to the extent achievable) decision maker or judiciary to hear claims or resolve 
disputes” (Tamanaha, 1995).   Finn’s (2004) definition centres around power and 
accountability: 
 
“Most understandings of the rule of law, at whatever level of normative  
abstraction, have at their center a concern with the accountability and 
principled exercise of government power.  The rule of law…is less about 
the imposition of limits on power than developing the sense that any 
exercise of public power must be defensible against a set of stable, 
knowable, and public norms…It is best to understand the rule of law as a 
commitment to a particular kind of governance, one based on the 
principles of accountability, stability, and uniformity, as a regime 
fundamentally concerned with preventing the arbitrary exercise of power”  
(Finn, 2004, Pg 12). 
 
And still slightly different, the World Bank’s “Governance Matters” measures rule 
of law against the extent to which there is confidence in and respect of a set of 
rules:  “…perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence” (Kaufman, et al, 2007, Pg 4). 
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Similar to questions on when a country can declare itself an “official democracy,” 
similar queries arise as to whether there are benchmarks to gauge the strength 
of rule of law.  For example, just how much judicial independence is necessary to 
secure the rule of law?  Finn (2004) argues that this is difficult to discern given 
that,   
 
“In no democratic regime are judges completely independent; nor would we  
want them to be, whether as a matter of democratic theory or of constitutional  
theory…Stable democracies seek instead elaborate and complex systems of  
interdependence, so what we desire when we construct the rule of law is 
some indeterminate and unknowable amount of judicial independence.  Too 
little and we forfeit the capacity of judges to hold rulers to account.  Too much 
and we sacrifice basic principles of democratic accountability.  What we want 
is a judiciary that is ‘relatively autonomous’ of the regime by capable of 
distancing itself from and sometimes overriding the policy preferences of the 
regime” (Finn, 2004, Pg 16). 
 
The definitions cited above have related overwhelmingly to rule of law within a 
national framework.  But where domestic laws lack the appropriate values and 
teeth, international laws can fill the vacuum to enforce the rule of law in a given 
context.  Similar to arguments that law need not be confined to legal or 
governmental entities, lines of analysis have emerged around how “trans-
governmental networks have formed to develop strategies for regulatory 
cooperation in response to deepening economic and financial integration…” 
(Berman, 2005, Pg 502).  In response to these and other forms of global 
governance, the field of ‘global administrative law’ (GAL), as defined by NYU’s 
Global Administrative Law Project, has been formed to ensure a set of global 
administrative bodies meet “adequate standards of transparency, consultation, 
participation, rationality, and legality, and by providing effective review of the 
rules and decisions these bodies make” (NYU GAL Project website).   
 
The GAL field sees law as active not in a strictly international space, but instead 
where, “administrative functions are performed in complex relations between 
officials and institutions not organized in a single hierarchy” and where there 
exists an “…enmeshment of national and intergovernmental regulation.”  In this 
space, “exercises of public power…are increasingly channeled, and controlled, 
by mechanisms of an administrative law type.  These include rules requiring 
greater transparency, adoption of notice-and-comment procedures in rule-
making, and the opening of new or strengthened avenues of judicial and 
administrative review.”3
 
  Global administrative law raises the important role that 
other institutions, beyond domestic courts, work to advance the rule of law.   
Specialized agencies, such as human rights commissions, also play important 
roles in advancing the rule of law. 
                                                 
3. NYU Global Administrative Law Website:  http://www.iilj.org/GAL/default.asp: “GAL Working Definition.” 
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Given that the majority of commentators on rule of law are Western legal 
scholars, a more fundamental point is that the rule of law doctrine may mean 
very different things across varying legal traditions (e.g. common, civil and 
Islamic law).  Mednicoff (2006) presents an interesting analysis of the points in 
common and contention when considering the rule of law from the perspective of 
the Middle East.  He notes that, “…due to the influence of Islamic legal ideals 
and development, the rule of law exists as a political touchstone in Arab societies 
in a manner similar to its status in the United States.  Yet particular differences in 
the socio political history of the Middle East and North America shape local 
understandings and implementation of the rule of law in significant ways”  
(Mednicoff, 2006, Pg 256).  While he argues that there is no obvious reason why 
the fundamental underpinnings of the rule of law as constraining governmental 
abuse and providing procedural fairness would not be relevant in the Arab world, 
he does recognize that the differences that do exist based on historical 
influences has created cynicism throughout this region as to governments’ and 
outsiders’ use of the term. 
 
Frank Bogel (2000) explains the problematic nature of using the phrase ‘rule of 
law’ in the context of Saudi Arabia, given that a ‘code’ or ‘statute’ does not exist 
in that context:  “The legal system rejects qanun [‘code’ or ‘statute’] entirely, 
refusing to codify even its basic civil laws.  It uses the term ‘nizam’, or regulation, 
for the limited number of man-made laws it does have” (Bogel, 2000, Pg 129).  
Besides verbal differences in the rule of law paradigm that are not easily 
translated from English, Bogel argues that there are even wider cultural and legal 
differences.  There are also unique concepts in Islamic law that present chasms 
with Western secular systems:  “The ideal of law in Saudi Arabia, and in 
numerous Islamic legal systems in the centuries before it, is that God rules 
directly, through his literal words conveyed in the Qur’an” (Bogel, 2000, Pg 4).   
 
The challenge to better understanding and learning from different legal systems 
thus lies in finding,  
 
“…a comparative framework for discussion between the two legal cultures  
which, without being vanishingly vague, can represent the many ideal and  
functional parallels between the legal systems or, rather, between these  
groups of legal systems, since each contains systems with its own 
character” (Bogel, 2000, Pg 129). 
 
Ren (1997) similarly points out the failure of much of the comparative legal 
scholarship in sorting out what is and is not relevant for comparison: 
“…comparative legal studies of the Chinese system of law have not yet 
established a clear theoretical pigeonhole, legal presuppositions, and a reliable 
legal vocabulary for sorting out its relevance from irrelevance.  For instance, in 
discussing the individual’s right to privacy, we must first justify the conceptual 
relevance of privacy, which is at the heart of Western civilization but has literally 
no legal status in Chinese traditional law” (Ren, 1997, Pg 7). 
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The differences that exist across common and civil law traditions also have 
implications for how the rule of law is implemented.  Genty (2008) points to the 
significant practical differences that exist across the two systems, especially in 
terms of roles for legal actors: 
 
“The most obvious [differences] are the respective roles of judges and 
lawyers.  As noted above, judges are the primary ‘law makers’ in the common 
law system.  However, paradoxically, they play a mostly reactive role in 
litigation. It is the lawyers who make the important choices and control the 
litigation process. Judges respond to what is brought to them - motions, 
discovery disputes, etc. – but because most civil litigation is resolved through 
settlement, a judge may actually have relatively little to do with the conduct or 
outcome of a typical case.  In contrast, judges in the civil law system are in 
control from the beginning. Under the inquisitorial method that is used in civil 
law jurisdictions, judges, not lawyers, decide what evidence is necessary and 
from whom. They dictate the timing and flow of a case, including which 
witnesses should be examined. A typical trial, civil or criminal, will consist of a 
series of examinations conducted by the judge, with the role of the lawyers 
limited to suggesting additional questions for the judge to ask of each 
witness” (Genty, 2008, Pg 142). 
 
All of these differences must be recognized in order to understand the landscape 
of legal traditions and definitions in which the ‘rule of law’ is embedded.  
 
 
III. The Rule of Law and Development – What Relationship? 
 
While Davis and Trebilcock (2008) cite the recent resurgence of academic 
interest in the rule of law and development, they are struck by the lack of 
consensus about what role the rule of law plays in promoting development.  This 
section of the paper provides an overview of how the rule of law might influence 
development, and what evidence exists.    
 
a. Three Moments in Time – History of Rule of Law and 
Development 
 
Trubek and Santos (2006) write about the evolution of law and development 
theory, and how arguments have changed to support the relevance of 
considering rule of law issues within the context of international development.  In 
particular, they point to “three moments in time” where different theories 
emerged.   
 
The first moment began with 1950s and 1960s development policy that saw the 
state as central in managing the economy and social development.  During this 
time, law was seen as a “tool for economic management and a lever for social 
change…an instrument for effective state intervention in the economy” (Trubek 
and Santos, 2006, Pg 5).  More specifically, effective law was required “to create 
the framework for operation of an efficient governmental bureaucracy and the 
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governance of public sector corporations.  Legal rules are needed to manage 
complex exchange controls and import regulations” (Trubek and Santos, 2006, 
Pg 5).  In other words, law could influence social behaviour in a way that 
encouraged development.  Extending from this theory were development 
schemes that included transplanting regulatory laws from the developed world, 
and modernizing the legal profession.  As Davis and Trebilcock describe it, 
“…such a conception of law as an instrument of, and not merely a response to 
development, as well as the view of the lawyer as a ‘social engineer,’ was 
entirely in line with the ‘perceived need for rapid, directed change’ underlying the 
modernization school’s notion of development” (Davis and Trebilcock, 2008, pg 
900).    
 
Moving along a parallel track with development theory, the 1980s marked Trubek 
and Santos’ second moment, where neoliberal market theory took precedence 
in scholarly debates.  During this second moment, law shifted from being an 
instrument of state policy to an instrument of market relations and a limit on the 
state, with the purpose of, “…protecting business against the intrusions of the 
government…The vision of law in the Second Moment was as an instrument to 
foster private transactions…the independent judiciary was a means to provide 
fidelity to the law and predictability” (Trubek and Santos, 2006, Pg 5).  Just as 
relevant, during the second moment, the law was not seen as a guarantor of 
political and civil rights or as protector of the weak or disadvantaged.   
 
Between the second and third moments, development theory shifted once again, 
with emerging critiques that there are limits to what markets can do for 
development, and related, the expansion of the definition of development beyond 
economic growth.  Thus, the third moment – from the 1990s through to current 
day – sees law as more than just a tool to ensure economic predictability.  While 
not letting go of the instrumental rationale associated with the rule of law, the 
third moment thinkers “also see legal institutions as part of what is meant by 
development, so that legal reform is now justified whether or not it can be tied 
directly to growth” (Trubek and Santos, 2006, Pg 9).  Thus, the current approach 
to rule of law and development espouses not only principles of law leading to 
more efficient markets, but also as a means to, “…curb market excess, support 
the social, and provide direct relief to the poor” (Trubek and Santos, 2006, Pg 8).   
With this change also comes a more prescriptive role for judges, where they 
“…not only have to protect property rights and be sure contracts are enforced; 
they also have to be sure they interpret regulatory law correctly, protect a wider 
range of human rights, and contribute to poverty reduction…And since the 
judiciary is now linked to poverty reduction and the social, it is important to 
provide access to justice for those most in need” (Trubek and Santos, 2006, Pg 
9).   
 
Another important theoretical shift during the third moment is the connection 
between two groups: the human rights movement and those promoting legal 
reform.  The concept of the rule of law came from, “the recognition that purely 
international approaches to human rights protection were insufficient without 
strong counterparts in domestic law.  The human rights movement began to look 
 9 
at domestic institutions, championing the creation of constitutional guarantees, 
judicial review, greater judicial independence, and ‘access to justice.’  This path 
naturally led to ideas about the construction of the ‘rule of law’” (Trubek and 
Santos, 2006, Pg 84). Thus, the rule of law became a concept that could be 
supported by those promoting democracy, human rights, and growth.  
 
Interestingly, at least a portion of the reform agenda that came along with this 
third moment reverted back to the mistakes of the first – namely the 
transplantation of models from north to south, and a typically top-down approach:   
 
“[T]here was…a strong belief in the possibility of legal transplantation, a  
willingness to conduct reforms at once in all parts and levels of the legal 
order, and a view that there was one model of ‘the rule of law’ that made 
sense for all countries.  Further, there was a faith that the needed reforms 
could be imposed from the top, and would be quickly and easily accepted” 
(Trubek and Santos, 2006, Pg 86). 
 
Recent work from the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor4 
deserves mentioning in terms of third moment thinking.  Its June 2008 report, 
“Making the law work for everyone” stated that 4 billion people in the world are 
excluded from the rule of law.5
                                                 
4 The commission, hosted by UNDP, was launched in 2005 by a group of developing and industrialized 
countries: Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, 
Tanzania and United Kingdom. The co-chairs of the commission were Madeleine Albright, former U.S. 
Secretary of State and, Hernado de Soto, Peruvian economist and founder of the Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy. During the course of the three years, 22 national consultation processes were conducted with 
representatives from local government, academia, civil society, and grassroots movements. Additionally, five 
technical working groups were established and submitted specialized reports.   More information can be 
found here: 
  The commission underlined a strong relationship 
between poverty and the rule of law, noting that poverty can only be eliminated 
with a shift of focus toward removing the barriers that hold the poor back and on 
building a framework of laws and institutions that provide genuine protection and 
opportunity for all.  In short, they recommend four areas of concentration for 
improvement, including: 1) access to justice through improved identity 
registration systems, affordable dispute resolution and improved legal literacy; 2) 
property rights through the promotion of an inclusive system and making property 
and credit markets accessible to the poor; 3) labour rights through the 
strengthening of voice, representation, regulation, and rights for informal workers; 
and 4) business rights, through the streamlining of administrative procedures, the 
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/  
5 The Commission’s report bases this figure on the following data: “In studies conducted on the ground in 20 
countries since 1998…the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) conservatively estimated that between 
70 percent and 90 percent of the urban and rural population were extralegal.  Applying these results to 179 
developing and former Soviet nations, according to the degree of development of their institutional 
framework, it was found that 85 percent of the population lived in extralegal areas. Given a population of 4.9 
billion in these 179 countries, it was concluded that at least 4.1 billion live in extralegal areas.  Studies by a 
number of other organisations confirm this figure. The International Labour Organisation, in the 2002 edition 
of Key Indicators of the Labour Market estimated that ’more than 70 percent of the workforce in developing 
countries operates in the informal economy.’ Taking into account the dependents of these workers, this 
means that at least 4.3 billion people in these countries rely on informal activities for their day-to-day 
subsistence. The World Bank Institute, using conventional definitions of under-employment and poverty, 
has come up with similar estimates” http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/report/index.html.  
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broadening of access to financial services and inclusive rule-setting (Commission 
on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, 2008). 
 
 
b. Arguments and Evidence on Rule of Law and Development  
 
While there is some documented evidence on how the rule of law interacts with 
development, Davis & Trebilcock (2008) cite that, “A good deal of the debate 
around law and development is about how to go about it, rather than whether it 
has the potential to promote development” (Davis & Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 917).   
They also argue that while there has been a great deal of academic interest in 
recent years, and while several volumes6
 
 written “…reflect decades of both 
practical experience with and scholarly reflection upon legal reforms in 
developing countries, at the end of the day they are remarkably inconclusive” 
(Davis & Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 897).   
Because of this, these same authors appear somewhat surprised as a result of 
the bold claims of the New Institutional Economics make about the potential 




 “The legal system may be the main explanation in the difference in  
development that exists between industrialized countries and those that 
are not industrialized.” 
  
“Development is possible only if efficient legal institutions are available to 
all citizens.” 
   
“The law is the most useful and deliberate instrument of change available 
to people” (De Soto, quoted in Davis in Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 903). 
 
Of the main evidence that exists to support the connection between rule of law 
and development, the most extensive is that related to economic growth and 
institutional development.   
 
 
The Rule of Law and Economic Growth 
The basic theoretical arguments that connect law to economic development are 
summarized by Haggard, MacIntyre and Tiede (2007) in the following excerpt: 
 
“The core theoretical insight linking law to economic development runs 
through two distinct but closely related channels: the effects of property 
rights on investment and the effects of contract enforcement on trade.  
References to the role of the state as an enforcer of property rights and 
                                                 
6 Including Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad:In Search of Knowledge;  Kenneth 
Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic Development, and David Trubek and Alvaro 
Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal.   
7 Hernando De Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution In The Third World 185, 1989. 
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contracts can be found in classical political economy.  But it was not until 
the 1960s that work by Coase (1960), etc…laid the groundwork of the new 
institutional economics, of which property rights and the contract design 
and enforcement constituted a core component.  These innovations were 
followed by important applications in the new economic history, of which 
North was the most influential proponent (North & Thomas 1973; North 
1981; 1990).  In North’s accounts, secure rights in property were the key 
to sustained economic growth.  These ideas enjoyed yet another revival 
with the strand of the new growth theory that focused on institutions” 
(Haggard et al, 2007, Pg 206). 
 
Institutions categorized under the rule of law8 are included in the above 
mentioned work on institutions and economic development, thus a good deal of 
evidence exists to support its connection to economic growth.  One such 
influential study conducted by the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton of the 
World Bank, called Governance Matters9
 
, found “strong correlations (they assert 
causation) between each of their sub-indices of institutional quality, including the 
rule of law index…” (Davis and Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 939).  Kaufman’s 
“Governance Redux: the Empirical Challenge” (2004) states that,  
“…an improvement in rule of law by one standard deviation from the 
current levels in Ukraine to those ‘middling’ levels prevailing in South 
Africa would lead to a fourfold increase in per capita income in the long 
run.  A larger increase in the quality of the rule of law (by two standard 
deviations) in Ukraine (or in other counties in the former Soviet Union), to 
the much higher level in Slovenia or Spain, would further multiply this 
income per capita increase” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 8, quoting 
from Kaufmann, 2004). 
 
Several other papers provide econometric evidence of the positive link between 
rule of law and growth (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2006; Rigobon and Rodrik 
2005; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). These papers use composite 
indicators to measure the quality of rule of law, which is then compared to 
income. All three papers conclude that there is a robust positive relationship 
between rule of law and growth – Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya state that their 
findings support the “apparent consensus of the empirical growth literature […] 
that the maintenance of rule of law is important for economic growth” (Butkiewicz 
and Yanikkaya, 2006, Pg 649).   
 
Dam (2005) – while admittedly not contributing substantial new [econometric] 
evidence – puts forth compelling reasons why for policy makers, three aspects of 
                                                 
8 While the discussion below addresses how economic development may be affected by a formal rule of law, 
Dixit (2004) puts forward analysis on how (in the absense of state law) alternative arrangements (i.e. non-
governmental) perform the same functions (Dixit, 2004, Pg 8).  Examples include self-enforcing governance 
through repeated interaction and the prospect of long-term relationships as well as private government (i.e. 
payment for services).  Haggard, et al (2008) also treat this issue. 
9 Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters, (1999) World Bank Policy Research Working Papers No. 
2196 (available for download on http:// www.worldbank.org/research). 
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the rule of law are particularly important to address for a country’s economic 
development, namely: i) the judiciary, ii) equity markets; and iii) credit markets.  
First, Dam argues that the judiciary is of significant concern for developing 
countries because “enforcement is usually more important than the details of 
substantive law in creating the conditions for economic development” (Dam, 
2005, Pg 24).  He outlines three potential areas of focus when considering how 
to improve a judiciary: 1) to investigate the operational details of the court 
system, 2) the quality of the judiciary, and 3) the relation of the judiciary to the 
rest of the government.  He argues that while “[m]ost bilateral and international 
economic assistance programs have focused on the first perspective – the 
operational aspects…the problems facing the judiciary in many developing 
countries go much deeper, which leads to the second perspective: the quality of 
the judiciary and, not least, the judges themselves”  (Dam, 2005, Pg 228). 
 
Second, Dam suggests that a strong corporate sector is vital to development, but 
that in many developing countries, the problem of concentrated shareholding 
stunts the opportunity for attracting financial and managerial resources needed 
for large-scale economic activity.  This problem of corporate governance – which 
he asserts could be fixed by improving corporate law and strengthening 
enforcement through an independent judiciary – presents a “tailor-made formula 
for expropriation of the value of minority shareholdings.”  This, he argues, creates 
a situation where “the ability of the economy to mobilize capital through broad-
based equity markets is inevitably limited and the role of the corporate sector in 
spurring economic development is correspondingly limited” (Dam, 2005, Pg 229). 
 
Third, Dam concludes that endemic problems associated with credit markets – 
especially given their size and centrality for economic development in developing 
countries – can be addressed by law reform and prudent regulation.  He points to 
three kinds of lending that contribute to poor credit markets:  “directed lending, in 
which governments and powerful politicians use their influence to direct bank 
loans to favoured sectors and companies; crony capitalism, in which a bank’s 
controlling shareholders and executives – often the same people – may lend to 
politicians or others who can protect and promote the bank; and related lending, 
in which banks lend to enterprises owned by the bank or its executives” (Dam, 
2005, Pg 229). 
 
However, while admitting that a great deal of literature exists to link property 
rights, contracts and rule-of-law institutions to positive economic growth, Haggard 
et al caution that the fundamental problem is not about “getting the law right”, but 
instead the reality of “…a complex causal chain that includes a variety of 
complementary institutions and political bargains – with respect to security, 
appropriate checks on private capture of the state, institutional checks on state 
power, and the more discrete freatures of the judicial and legal system.  In 
simplest form: Property rights and contracting rest upon institutions, but these in 
turn rest upon deep coalitions of consenting interests” (Haggard et al, 2007). 
   
Evidence also exists that counters the assertion of a strong link between the 
nature of a country’s rule of law and its economic development.  This is what 
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Davis and Trebilcock call the “informed alternative” camp, which argues, “…there 
is virtually no connection between the nature of a society’s legal system and its 
development prospects…development is not necessarily associated with a legal 
system, and thus the state of the legal system should not be used as a 
benchmark for development” (David and Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 933).  Concerns 
have been raised about the data used to connect the rule of law and economic 
development, which Trebilcock and Daniels note are often subjective 
assessments.  They point out that: 
 
“In most studies the rule of law appears to be measured in part by 
reference to the characteristics of legal institutions and in part by 
reference to the extent of compliance with the law….countries that score 
well on rule of law indices that are based at least in part upon rates of 
compliance with the rule of law may be scoring highly for reasons that 
have little to do with the ‘strength’ of their legal system” (Trebilcock and 
Daniels, 2008, Pg 10). 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004) provide econometric evidence that counters an “apparent 
consensus” of the causality between rule of law and economic growth.  In 
particular, the paper studies several of the institutions used as indicators for rule 
of law (e.g. the risk of expropriation by the government, constraints on the 
executive, and government effectiveness). Glaeser et al. find flaw with the 
indicators and instrumental variable techniques used in other econometric 
studies. The results of this research support the hypothesis that the direction of 
causality espoused by the law-growth optimists is incorrect, and that institutions 
(and the rule of law) are in fact improved by economic growth, not vice-versa. 
 
Other opposition is outlined by Jensen (2003) and Davis and Trebilcock (2008) in 
citing the good economic records of countries like China, which have poor 
records on the rule of law:  
 
“China, for example, has enjoyed high levels of foreign direct investment 
and growth; and Brazil has a growing credit market based on the dense 
information available through new technologies and databases, both of 
which tend to substitute for strong legal institutions.  At the same time, 
actors in India are pursuing international capitalization by adhering to 
more rigorous international standards of corporate governance – even 
more rigorous than their domestic laws would require” (Jensen, 2003, Pg 
342). 
 
“Upham…forcefully points out that Japan’s most impressive period of 
economic development coincided with a period in which the Japanese 
government deliberately limited the role that the legal system played in 
Japanese society by, among other things, drastically limiting the number 
of qualified lawyers.” (Davis and Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 936). 
 
“Capitalism in East Asia…is characterized by networks of relationships, 
both between economic agents and between economic agents and the 
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state, which operate largely outside the formal legal system.  In this brand 
of capitalism, the legal system plays a marginal role and so substantial 
investments in legal reform are of dubious value” (Davis and Trebilcock, 
2008, Pg 933). 
 
Haggard et al (2007) also caution against overemphasizing the role of formal 
institutions: “…property rights and contracts rest on institutions, which 
themselves rest on coalitions of interests.  Formal institutions are important, but, 
particularly in developing countries, informal institutional arrangements play a 
significant part as well” (Haggard, et al, 2007, Pg 205).   
   
 
Rule of Law, Equality and Social Change 
Another positive argument exists that supports the rule of law as intrinsically 
worthwhile, as it contributes to a country’s social equality and fairness – i.e. it can 
be seen as part of the development process.  This argument is summarized by 
Trebilcock and Daniels (2008) below: 
 
“From a deontological perspective, such as that adopted by Sen, where 
freedom, in its various dimensions, is both the end and means of 
development, various freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, 
freedom of political association, freedom of political opposition and 
dissent, are defining normative characteristics of development; the rule of 
law, to the extent that it guarantees these freedoms, has an intrinsic value, 
independent of its effect on various other measures of development and 
does not need to be justified solely in instrumental terms, although a 
commitment to protecting these freedoms may also coincidentally serve 
important instrumental functions” (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, Pg 5).   
 
On a similar line, constitutional guarantees of rights are sometimes argued to be, 
“…ends in themselves [and] manifestations of a society’s moral commitments” 
(Davis and Trebilcock, 2008, Pg 905). 
 
Another argument concerns the ability of the judiciary to incite positive social 
change linked with development gains.  While the traditional roles of protecting 
the rights and liberties of the people, interpreting legal and constitutional 
provisions, and resolving disputes among different litigants has been widely 
explored, the role of judicial activism, or the advocacy of new laws by the 
judiciary, could be explored further.  In India, a 1979 news item published in the 
Indian Express described the plight of prisoners held under trial who had been 
languishing for periods longer than the maximum punishment prescribed, led an 
advocate to file a petition in the Supreme Court.  The judiciary took up the issue, 
which may be considered the birth of judicial activism in India.  Issues that 
followed included the right to information (which led to a Freedom of Information 
Bill in 2002); gender jurisprudence; Dalit jurisprudence; health and child 
protection.  However, the rise of judicial activism can lead to tensions between 
elected bodies and the judiciary, both vying for influence, which evokes questions 
of jurisdiction between the two camps. 
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Sherif (2000), sights the Egyptian case as one where the Supreme Constitutional 
Court has played a fundamental role in advancing constitutional guarantees and 
human rights, and points to knock-on effects that the Egyptian judiciary has had 
beyond its borders:  “…its rulings have been quite progressive in defining the 
rights accorded to all Egyptian citizens under the Constitution and under current 
notions of human rights.  The rulings of the court are not only binding in Egypt 
and followed by all its courts, but are closely observed by judicial systems and 
governments throughout the Arab World” (Sherif, 2000, Pg 1). 
 
Jensen (2003) cites the widely-held perception that activist courts somehow push 
the envelope and lead to social change.  Contrary to this conventional wisdom is 
evidence from a US study that demonstrates that the supreme court (at least in 
the United States) “generally lags behind social movements” and yet “the image 
of an activist court prevails” (Jensen, 2003, Pg 344).   
 
 
The Rule of Law and International Governance 
As mentioned above, the Global Administrative Law project at NYU seeks to, 
“systematize studies in diverse national, transnational, and international settings 
that relate to the administrative law of global governance” (Kingsbury et al, 2005, 




 International Administration by formal international organizations (such 
as United Nations Security Council individual sanctions programs, or UN 
administration of territory); 
 Network Administration based on collective action by transnational 
networks of cooperative arrangements between national regulatory 
officials (such as the Basel Committee of national bank regulators); 
 Distributed Administration conducted by national regulators under treaty, 
network, or other cooperative regimes (such as the Basel Convention on 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes);  
 Hybrid Administration, by hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements 
(such as ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers); and  
 Private Administration, by private institutions with regulatory functions 
(such as the ISO, the International Organization for Standardization).  
 
In considering these globalized forms of administration, the project asks how 
principles related to domestic administrative law might be applied to an 
international setting.   First, in terms of ensuring transparency, accountability and 
the rights of affected parties to have their concerns heard in advance of decision 
making, Kingsbury et al (2005) note that to date in the international setting of 
rule-making and regulatory decisions, “participation rights in rulemaking have 
been afforded in only a limited number of instances and areas” (Kingsbury et al, 
                                                 
10 GAL Website, “Working Definition”: http://www.iilj.org/GAL/GALworkingdefinition.asp.  
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Pg 38).  They also note that developments on this front have to date been 
generally voluntary in nature.   
 
Second, the principle of applying reasons for administrative decisions including 
responses to the major arguments made by the parties or commenters, is 
another area for consideration.  In the area of global rulemaking, however, they 
outline that this principle has rarely been extended, “though some organizations 
provide them in order to strengthen the acceptability of their actions to affected 
interests. The Basle Committee, for example, has established a web-based 
dialogic process in developing its new capital adequacy requirements for banks; 
drafts are posted, comments are invited, and reasons are given by the 
Committee in connection with new and revised drafts” (Kingsbury, et al, Pg 39).   
 
The entitlement to have an administrative decision reviewed by a court or an 
independent tribunal is – to some extent – mirrored in global administration:  
“[a]cceptance of the importance of review is reflected in the establishment of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, and also in the right of appeal to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport from doping decisions” (Kingsbury et al, Pg 39).    
 
Other important domestic principles from administration law for consideration in 
the global realm include the application of substantive standards (i.e. 
proportionality, rational relation between means and ends, use of less restrictive 
means, or legitimate expectations), immunities (i.e. the immunity of foreign 
states) and exceptions due to security interests or decisions made by central 
banks (Kingsbury et al, Pg 42).  The authors contest that more research should 
be conducted to understand when the above have been applied and where or 
how they might be appropriate in the international context.   
 
 
IV. The Rule of Law and Democracy – Necessarily Reinforcing?  
 
As is widely recognized, there are many different ways to define democracy, and 
similar to the rule of law, definitions can range from thick to thin.  Narrow 
definitions may say nothing of the rule of law (e.g. electoral democracy), while 
wider definitions often include rule of law as one of democracy’s main 
components.  Foweraker and Krznaric (2008) note that over time, liberal 
democracy has come to include “…the main institutional and legal means for 
achieving and defending the principles of liberty and equality…” (Foweraker and 
Krznaric, 2008, Pg 31).  Sen (1999) proclaims that democracy “requires the 
protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the 
guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair 
comment” (Sen, 1999, Pg 9).  
 
Guillermo O’Donnell puts forward a similar, but expanded idea that democracy 
be based on the following main ideas: a) the individual has inherent rights; b) 
society is organized in a way that guarantees the exercise of these rights and 
promotes the expansion of citizenship; and c) free and competitive elections, 
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together with the rule of law, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
democracy (UNDP, 2004, Pg 30).   
 
Even if the rule of law is not defined as part of democracy, it is certainly seen as 
a factor that advances democracy across much of the literature.  Finn (2004) 
argues that,  
 
 “…the rule of law complements principles of democratic accountability by  
prohibiting the exercise of arbitrary power….The rule of law may also 
contribute to democratization by increasing the capacity of newly democratic 
regimes to govern…Related, and no less important, the rule of law can 
contribute to democratic stability and maintenance by shaping civic society, 
by reinforcing citizens’ commitment to democracy itself.  At the most basic 
level this can occur by persuading citizens that the rule of law and democratic 
regimes actually do promote effective governance – that such regimes can 
govern effectively and materially improve the quality of their citizens’ lives” 
(Finn, 2004, Pg 12).   
 
As an example, Mehta (2007) notes that while Public Interest Litigation (PIL)11
 
 in 
India has had no conclusive impact on poverty or correcting injustice, “…the 
provision of a forum to which citizens marginalized by the corruptions of routine 
politics can turn has arguably given serious moral and psychological 
reinforcement to the legitimacy of the democratic system” (Mehta, 2007, Pg 71).  
Maravall (2003) argues that the rule of law and (electoral) democracy are highly 
intertwined in terms of the two instruments that citizens have at their disposal to 
protect them:  “…to throw the rulers out of office at election time; [and]…to 
enforce, through institutions, legal limits to the political discretion of incumbents 
between elections.  The first protection is provided by democracy; the second by 
the rule of law” (Maravall, 2003, Pg 261).   
Despite this closeness in definition and an oft-cited complementarity, many 
tensions between democracy and the rule of law exist.  Ferejohn and Pasquino’s 
(2003) arguments respond to why the rule of law should not necessarily be 
wrapped up in the definition of democracy, at least at the institutional level.  They 
argue that the two operate quite separately from each other in practice, which 
may have implications for any causal relationship assumed:  
 
“…democracy and the rule of law are embodied in distinct institutional 
systems.  Democracy principally concerns electoral institutions, 
governments, and legislatures.  Law operates through courts, police, and 
lawyers.  To be sure, there is an intersection – the legislature, and 
                                                 
11 In PIL cases, the Court relaxes the normal legal requirements of “standing” and “pleading,” which require 
that litigation be pressed by a directly affected party or parties, and instead allows anyone to approach it 
seeking correction of an alleged evil or injustice. Such cases also typically involve the abandonment of 
adversarial fact-finding in favor of Court-appointed investigative and monitoring commissions. Finally, in PIL 
matters the Court has expanded its own powers to the point that it sometimes takes control over the 
operations of executive agencies (Mehta, 2007, Pg 71).  
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perhaps the jury trial – where democracy and law come into close contact.  
But this contact is brief, and, for the most part, law takes on a life of its 
own once it issues from the legislative process” (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 
2003, Pg 243). 
 
Going farther, Mehta (2007) notes that in India, parliament and the judiciary have 
been and are likely to remain competitors when it comes to interpreting the 
constitution (Mehta, 2007).   He notes a trend toward what he calls ‘post-
democracy’ where nonelected decision making is gaining power over institutions 
made up of elected representatives, for which he ponders the relevance:      
 
“The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious when a few people (mostly 
older and mostly male, as it happens) assume such broad powers over 
our destiny without much accountability.  At least, we ruminate, we can 
throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are mostly shielded 
from accountability. And yet our impatience with a debilitating political 
process whose usual results are inaction or unsatisfying compromises 
makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary” (Mehta, 2007, Pgs 79-80).   
 
Similarly, Ferejohn and Pasquino (2003) highlight that over the past seventy 
years, courts have become much more active in expanding the list of civil rights 
that “places severe limits on the policies governments can undertake and the 
way permissible projects may be pursued.”  They go on to say that in Europe at 
least, “both national and supranational courts have begun to play a much more 
active and important role in deciding important and controversial social 
questions, questions traditionally decided by governments and parliaments” 
(Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2003, Pg 249). 
 
Maravall (2003) echoes this strain between representative and judicial bodies, 
and describes how democracy and rule of law interact in a way that can be 
conflictual: “[p]erhaps democracy demands that the range of choice open to 
government be broad and not constricted by externally imposed restraints (such 
as legal protections for minorities).” While on the other hand, “…perhaps, 
democracy requires that the people be regularly and genuinely consulted on 
fundamental legal changes so that institutions or practices of deliberation and 
consultation are in place and functioning” (Maravall, 2003, Pg 242).  While both 
of these intentions (i.e. that policies reflect the views of the electorate and that 
the judiciary be independent) are independently desirable, this example shows 
that the two interact in a way that creates tension, and requires constant 
negotiation. 
 
With these thoughts in mind, two scenarios are considered below: democracy 
without the rule of law; and the rule of law without democracy. 
 
 
Democracy without the rule of law? 
Research from Latin America has shown that “…despite the rapid dissemination 
of competitive electoral politics across the new democracies, civil and minority 
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rights are still fragile, suggesting that the citizens of these democracies remain 
unprotected and vulnerable” (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2002, Pg 32).  The same 
study points to oligarchic political power (supported by clientelist politics) and 
military prerogatives (i.e. that armed forces and police remain largely 
unaccountable to elected civilian government) as plausible explanations. 
 
O’Donnell (2004) also elaborates on why it might be the case (again, in the Latin 
American context) that the rule of law is compromised while at the same time 
national-level democracy exists.  He cites flaws in existing laws as one of these 
reasons, where despite progress, “there still exist laws, judicial criteria, and 
administrative regulations that discriminate against women, members of 
indigenous peoples, and various other minorities, and which often force 
defendants, detainees, and prison inmates to endure conditions that are 
repugnant to any sense of fair process” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 39).   
 
Other flaws exist in the application of the law, and in access to the judiciary and 
fair process.  First, in the application of law, this is where the privileged manage 
to exempt themselves from the law, or as he puts it, “[t]here is an old Latin 
American tradition of ignoring or twisting the law in order to favor the strong and 
repress the weak” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 40).  Second, with respect to access, he 
argues that  
 
“[a]cross most of Latin America, the judiciary is too distant, cumbersome, 
expensive, and slow for the poor and vulnerable even to attempt to access 
it.  And if they do manage to obtain judicial access, the available evidence 
often points to severe and systematic discrimination. Criminal procedures 
in particular often tend to disregard the rights of the accused before, 
during, and after trial” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 40). 
 
Sheer lawlessness, caused by the limited reach of the legal state in poor peri-
urban areas or in districts distant from the capital, renders any formal rule of law 
ineffective and can result in the existence of a subnational system of power, as 
explained below: 
 
“…intermittent law is encompassed by the informal law enacted by the  
privatized-patrimonial, sultanistic, or simply gangsterlike-powers that 
actually rule those places. This leads to complex situations involving a 
continuous renegotiation of the boundaries between formal and informal 
legalities, situations in which it is vital to understand the interplay between 
both kinds of law and the uneven power relations that develop. The 
resulting informal legal system, punctuated by temporary reintroductions 
of the formal one, supports a world of extreme violence, as abundant data 
from both rural and urban regions show. These "brown areas" are 
subnational systems of power that have a territorial basis and an informal 
but quite effective legal system, yet they coexist with a regime that, at 




O’Donnell argues that this problem has in fact grown during periods of 
democratization, which he attributes to antistatist economic policies emerging 
from financial crises, as well as corruption within the political system.  
 
On a different track, yet also contributing to the scenario of democracy without 
the law, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) argue that the literature on legal 
accountability shows citizens face many problems when trying to subject the 
actions of their leaders and public officials to the rule of law.  This includes 
challenges in mobilizing citizens to punish disobeyers of the law, as well as a 
lack of an independent judiciary that can call rulers to account. 
 
 
The rule of law without democracy? 
On the other side of the spectrum, is it counterintuitive to consider whether rule of 
law can exist under an undemocratic regime?  If the rule of law is conceived in a 
thick way, then yes, as the law in cases of dictatorship likely fail the test of 
application equally and without preference across society.  That said, the fact 
that the law can be used as a means for oppression is important to keep in mind.  
Sachs and Pistor make an important distinction between the rule of law and the 
rule through law, the latter of which is where law is simply an administrative 
device, as opposed to a concept where a set of rules bind state officials.  Thus, 
“[t]he rule through law can entrench autocracy in law” (Kleinfeld Belton, 2005, pg 
34).   O’Donnell, supports this notion with the following: 
 
“[A]t times the rule of law (or at any rate, the rhetoric of the rule of law) has 
been employed in the service of authoritarian ideologies. In earlier times, 
in countries riven by severe inequality as so many in Latin America have 
been (and too often still are), practices associated with the law were not 
used in the service of fairness, but rather to entrench sharp inequalities 
and the manifold social ills associated with them” (O’Donnell, Pg 40).  
 
Similarly Carothers (2009) puts forward that in Russia and China, “…stronghand 
rulers have found that the rule of law works well as an alternative objective to 
democratization, not one that complements it but rather one that will help 
preserve authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule” (Carothers, 2009, Pg 54). 
 
Various case studies as well, including that of Barros (2003) who examines the 
rule of law under Pinochet’s Chile, show that a version of the rule of law can exist 
under autocracy, where the autocrats and the military are subject to a set of laws 
(Barros, 2003, Pg 197).  Singapore is a case where a well-established judicial 
framework exists in tandem with an insufficient separation of powers, and a lack 
of fundamental freedoms and democratic rights.  Despite the fact that 
Singapore’s judiciary lacks independence,12
  
 in 2005 Singapore placed second in 
a world ranking of legal frameworks published by the Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook (Yew, 2008).  
                                                 
12 Democracy Web: Comparative Studies in Freedom.  http://www.democracyweb.org/rule/singapore.php  
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V. Researchable Questions: Suggestions from the Literature 
 
Carothers summarizes the knowledge gap on the rule of law by identifying a 
number of serious obstacles to the accumulation of knowledge on the topic.  Two 
of these obstacles are, first, that “aid organizations have proven themselves to be 
ill-adept at the task of generating and accumulating the sort of knowledge that 
would help fill the [research] gap” (Carothers, 2006, Pg 26), and second, that 
neither political science departments nor law schools are funding such research 
either (Carothers, 2006, Pg 27).   The following is a summary of some of the 
researchable questions suggested in the literature. 
 
a. Institutional Design  
 
Put simply, while there has been a multitude of work on rule of law promotion and 
reform, little research exists that points to what the right institutional make-up 
of a functioning rule of law actually consists of.  David & Trebilcock 
summarize this problem with the following: 
 
“While there appears to be an increasingly firm, empirically grounded 
consensus that institutions are an important determinant of economic 
development (and probably other aspects of development), there is much 
less consensus on which legal institutions are important, given the 
existence of informal substitutes, what an optimal set of legal institutions 
might look like for any given developing country, or for those developing 
countries lacking optimal legal institutions (however defined) what form a 
feasible and effective reform process might take and the respective roles 
of “insiders” and “outsiders” in that process  (Davis and Trebilcock, 2008, 
Pg 945). 
 
The utility of oversight mechanisms also appears to suffer from an empirical 
vacuum.   Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) note that in the last decade, national, 
regional, provincial and municipal ombudsman offices have been created in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.   While these 
have apparently “contributed to the increase in the judicial oversight of rights and 
of administrative actions… their effectiveness still needs to be systematically 
studied” (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006, Pg 21).   
 
 
b. Comparative Legal Systems 
 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that lessons from well-functioning 
legal systems in one situation cannot be necessarily transplanted to another, due 
in part to the significant differences that exist across different legal traditions – 
civil, common and Islamic.  Thus, the challenge to better understanding and 
learning from different legal systems lies in finding the right comparative 
framework.  Research that draws on a wide range of legal traditions would 
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undoubtedly improve policy debates on the right institutional design for achieving 
the rule of law, which Bogel summarizes well below:       
 
“With such a framework in place, we will be able to share understanding 
of problems which are common across the legal cultures, including 
the many functional problems the rule of law should redress, such as 
how to ensure the independence of judges, how to suppress abusive 
police practices like torture to secure confessions, or how to prevent 
arbitrary or corrupt executive action” (Bogel, 2000, Pg 129).  
 
Questions also exist around the role of the rule of law across religious and 
secular societies which could be further explored in the context of comparative 
law.  According to Lau (2000), is the case of Islamic Law in Pakistan, outcomes 
remain ambiguous: 
 
“The role of Islam in the maintenance of the rule of law continues to be an 
ambiguous one.  On the one hand, Islam has been used by Pakistan’s 
higher judiciary to widen the ambit of constitutionally-guaranteed 
fundamental rights, and on the other the Government resorts to Islam as a 
means of weakening these very same rights.  Common to both, however, 
is the indigenization of the political and legal discourse in Pakistan which 
is gradually moving away from common-law precedents.  Islam and 
Islamic law have been firmly established on Pakistan’s legal landscape, 
capable of both supporting and undermining the rule of law” (Lau, 2000, 
Pg 162).   
 
Yamani (2000) argues that a distinction must be carefully made between the role 
of Islamic law and the (at times contradictory) interpretations of Islam that are 
used for political reasons.  For example, “while women are encouraged by the 
Government and general patriarchal system to be mothers and stay at home, 
those who are educated have become aware that Islamic law recognizes the 
financial and civil rights of women in relation to men, thus allowing women a 
measure of independence” (Yamani, 2000, Pg 137-8). 
 
 
b. Dynamics of Rule of Law Reform  
 
Aside from debates as to how the rule of law interacts with development and 
democracy, the question remains why it is so seemingly difficult to establish 
or strengthen legal systems in developing countries.   Trebilcock and Daniels 
(2008) cite several possible reasons.  Each on its own, or the balance of the 
three factors, could easily serve as areas for further research:   
 
 Technical or resource-related issues: countries lack the financial, 
technological or specialized human capital resources to implement 
good institutions generally, including legal institutions. 
 Social-cultural-historical factors:  A set of social values, norms, 
attitudes, or practices that are inhospitable to the rule of law.   
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 Political economy-based impediments:  lack of effective political 
demand for reforms and on the other hand supply-side vested interests 
that render reforms difficult to realize (Trebilcock & Daniels, 2008, Pg 
38). 
 
Political economy-based impediments are suggested as the most promising for 
study, as “…empirical evidence suggests that various forms of power structures 
often represent root-cause impediments to the rule of law” (Trebilcock & Daniels, 
2008, Pg 339).  Carothers (2006) also points to several researchable questions 
that remain unanswered in the area of rule of law reform, including:  
 
 How does will to reform develop?   
 Can it be generated and if so, how?   
 Should we assume that institutions change through gradualist reform 
processes willed by persons inside the system?   
 Does public pressure play a major role?   
 What about abrupt, drastic change provoked by persons outside the 
institutions who are dissatisfied with their function or who have their own 
goals about what institutions to have? (Carothers, 2006, Pg 22).   
 
Another question could be added to this list as to whether sequencing of 
institutional reforms plays any role in sustaining the rule of law, which builds on 
existing literature in the democracy field that explores similar questions.13
 
  
Even taking Carothers’ questions in mind, Clark (1999) provides a sobering 
reminder that “…the emergence of the rule of law has a history bound up with a 
prolonged political struggle and that it took a long time to be established, and in 
the history of government it is a recent and a rare accomplishment” (Clark, 1999, 
Pg 30).   
 
How civil society plays a role in ensuring the rule of law is accessible and 
meaningful to society is another area ripe for research.  Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz (2006) explain social accountability as ensuring governments are 
legally accountable to the public, with mechanisms that, “…entail a diverse group 
of civil society initiatives and media exposés organized around demands for the 
rule of law and due process.  By exposing and denouncing cases of 
governmental wrongdoing, activating horizontal agencies of control, and 
monitoring the operation of those agencies, mechanisms of social accountability 
make a crucial contribution to the enforcement of the rule of law” (Peruzzotti & 
Smulovitz, 2006, Pg 10).  For example, in Argentina and Brazil, a series of 
unrelated incidences of police violence led to the organization of local social 
movements and the establishment of permanent society-based monitoring 
associations.   
 
                                                 
13 See Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy.” Journal of Democracy.  Volume 18, Number 1, January 2007 
for a summary of the debate. 
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A host of issues ripe for research exists on how civil society interacts with the 
rule of law through social accountability measures.  O’Donnell (2006) suggests 
several questions that could be addressed in future research, including: 
 
 Which social accountability actions are heard, and which are not? 
 What role do balancing and appointed agencies play? 
 Which social accountability actions lead to some sort of state response 
activity but finally fail because they do not follow a complete institutional 
and decisional path?  
 To what extent do personal / organizational resources (time, information, 
media access, capacity of public and/or interpersonal communication, 
and money) affect the extent to which social accountability can be 
achieved? 
 
It is clear from the literature that more research is needed on the role of 
international assistance in supporting the rule of law.  As Carothers (2006) 
sums up, “…there is a surprising amount of uncertainty about the basic rationale 
for rule-of-law promotion” (Carothers, 2006, Pg 17).  Many commentators have 
called for modest expectations of what external promotion efforts will produce, 
and especially the extent to which Western models will be of any use to 
recipients.  Haggard et al (2007) note that “The initial enthusiasm about the gains 
from improving legal institutions has been followed by a wave of skepticism, 
much of it focused implicitly on problems of endogeneity.  If the efficacy of legal 
institutions depends on complementary features of the broader political system, 
apparently simple reforms may be well beyond the capacity of outsiders to effect” 
(Haggard et al, 2007, Pg 206).    
 
Jensen (2003) cautions that, “…the goals and expectations articulated in rule of 
law projects often diverge dramatically from their activities and accomplishments.  
Expectations tend to be bloated …they aim at broad substantive goals like 
strengthening individual rights and political institutions, and stabilizing the 
economy.  To the extent that these reform programs succeed, however, that 
success is often at the ‘thin’ level of the rule of law: improvements in the 
procedures and the efficiency of legal processes” (Jensen, 2003, Pg 339).  
O’Donnell (2004) goes farther in suggesting that current promotion efforts 
targeted at domestic and international commercial law, some aspects of civil law, 
and the more purely repressive aspects of criminal law may in fact “…produce a 
dualistic development of the justice system…For societies that are profoundly 
unequal, these trends may reinforce the exclusion of many from the rule of law, 
while further exaggerating the advantages that the privileged enjoy by means of 
laws and courts favoring their interests” (O’Donnell, 2004, Pg 42). 
 
 
c. The Changing Nature of Law-Making 
 
When one considers claims that 90 percent or more of the law-related 
problems that the poor face are handled outside the courts in much of the 
developing world (Golub, 2006, Pg 118), it follows that more research could be 
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done to understand traditional, customary and informal rule of law mechanisms.  
One interesting case of an alternative system – though not without flaws – can be 
found in India’s Lok Adalats.  In response to staggering statistics that “…in 2002 
there were 23 million pending court cases – 20,000 in the Supreme Court, 3.2 
million in the High Courts and 20 million in lower or subordinate courts” (Galanter 
& Krishnan, 2003), a system of courts that exist independent of the official law 
was created.   These “rival” systems deserve more careful analysis, as according 
to some commentators, they have the double flaws of diluting “…the efficacy of 
the state as adjudicator and enforcer of norms in everyday life” and “…sadly hold 
little promise for delivering effective legal services to those most in need” 
(Galanter & Krishnan, 2003, Pg 126). 
 
The changing role of the judiciary is another issue that could be further explored, 
and particularly the role of judicial activism and rising tensions between 
elected bodies and the judiciary, both vying for influence and jurisdiction.  In 
terms of the role of the judiciary in upholding the rights of the people, Mehta 
(2007) observes that while “[d]efenders of the judiciary often focus on the few 
success stories that result from judicial decisions…there is a glaring lack of 
concrete, empirical data on the effects of court interventions.  Courts can 
proclaim new rights as much as they want, but the proclamation of rights by itself 
does not produce results” (Mehta, 2007, Pg 81).   In India, he argues that the 
judiciary has been effective in stewarding education as a constitutional right, but 
on the right to health, judicial declarations have had little effect.  More research is 
required to better understand this issue.    
 
New issues have also arisen with the rise of globalization and the creation of 
trans-national networks that make rules and shape regulatory policy.  The 
Global Administrative Law project at NYU has raised issues concerning how 
domestic administrative law might be applied to international settings to ensure 
transparency, accountability, and the right of affective parties to have their views 
considered before a decision is taken.  Kingsbury et al (2005) put forward the 
following recommendations: 
 
“With a wide set of case studies of practice in particular areas, coupled 
with efforts to develop comparative and synthetic conceptual structures 
and normative theories, questions about the design of and need for 
mechanisms of transparency, participation, review, and legality in global 
administration may be more fully addressed. Moreover, a deeper analysis 
of doctrinal features and divergences will be possible, and hypotheses of 
positive political theory can be developed and tested.  Work on the 
normative issues is likely both to deepen transnational and global 
democratic theory and to raise challenging questions about its application 
to specific administrative structures and to the whole project of global 
administrative law. Normative inquiries will also enrich operational 
understandings of the place of diversity, equality, and equity in global 
administrative law. The need for alternative approaches to the currently 
dominant models of global governance and of administrative law is 




d. Economic Implications of the Rule of Law 
 
Haggard et al (2007) argue that the research program surrounding democracy, 
the rule of law, and growth is by no means finished.  Several opportunities to 
build on previous work exist.  Particularly, Dam advocates for gathering more 
empirical evidence on how economic growth is affected by the following 
three areas: 1) the judiciary – in particular to investigate the operational details 
of the court system, the quality of the judiciary, and the relation of the judiciary to 
the rest of the government; 2) problems associated with equity markets, with 
emphasis on the problem of concentrated shareholding, which stunts the 
opportunity for attracting financial and managerial resources need for large-scale 
economic activity; and 3) and poor credit markets, caused mainly by directed 
lending (in which governments and powerful politicians use their influence to 
direct bank loans to favoured sectors and companies), crony capitalism (where a 
bank’s controlling shareholders and executives – often the same people – may 
lend to politicians or others who can protect and promote the bank) and related 
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